A closer look

The First Gulf War and the Media

How did the U.S. government use television to build support for the invasion of Iraq during the first Gulf War?

by David Scheckel, American Social History Project, The Graduate Center, CUNY

War and Media Coverage

Between 1991 and 2003 the United States invaded and occupied Iraq twice. While the 2003 conflict became a major military and political debacle, the first invasion established a set of media policies that endured into the twenty-first century. Before the advent of social media, public access to war information was generally conveyed through established news outlets. From print newspapers and filmed newsreels to radio and television broadcasts, the story of international conflicts was told and framed by journalists, newscasters, media corporations, and political leaders. While the public may hope for objectivity in journalists’ coverage, the media’s reliance on access to sources from within the government and their financial interests internationally often shaped how they reported on wars. When television became a primary news source for most Americans, government officials and television executives alike faced the challenge of how to use this new medium in pursuit of their respective interests. The Vietnam War (1955–1975) was the first war televised on the nightly news. Historians, media scholars, and even government officials have argued that access to images of American soldiers in a distant land—including vivid footage of U.S. casualties and harsh treatment of Vietnamese people—played a large part in the public’s increasing opposition to the war. In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in January 1991, the U.S. government was determined to avoid allowing the media to again play such a prominent role in shaping public responses to the war, especially now that television news was not just on in the morning or the evening, but every hour of the day.

The birth of cable news in 1980 gave viewers more options beyond the nightly ABC, CBS, or NBC news broadcasts. Ted Turner’s CNN (which stands for cable news network) launched with an ambitious new strategy: twenty-four-hour news. Although the broadcast networks derided CNN’s shoestring budget and frequent gaffes, its ability to provide coverage of “breaking news” brought it prominence. If a newsworthy event occurred at 2:00 p.m., you could see a report within the hour instead of waiting until the networks’ evening broadcasts. As one news agency journalist noted in 1990: “So ubiquitous is CNN’s live coverage of breaking news events that both broadcast and print newsrooms all over the country continuously monitor the network.” The use of live coverage became an increasingly common feature of news programs across the networks by 1990, when the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein commenced an invasion of Kuwait and speculation began about how the U.S. would respond. The United States had generally cordial relations with Iraq and supported it during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) while also secretly supplying arms to Iran. But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait alarmed most of the Arab League states and was viewed as potentially destabilizing U.S. interests in the entire region. On January 16, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced Operation Desert Storm, and the U.S. began an aerial bombing campaign of Iraq.

Presenting the War on TV: What Was and Wasn’t Shown

“We have to go to Baghdad, Mr. Secretary. We’re going to Bernard Shaw in Baghdad.” CNN anchor David French cut off his interview with former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger to hear from the veteran CNN reporter Bernard Shaw about the breaking news. This dramatic moment began the four-month long, twenty-four-hour-a-day coverage of the war on all major U.S. news networks (as well as many abroad). Much of the coverage, even musical interludes that added patriotic music to footage of U.S. forces performing their missions, created the impression of wide support for the U.S. invasion. This perspective was enhanced through dramatic military-approved live video on location in Iraq, such as distant nighttime views of bombs dropping onto Baghdad, and frequent interviews with American military personnel on the scene. Air Force pilots described their bombing experiences to viewers as “lighting up Baghdad like a Christmas tree” (NBC) and as eliciting “the same adrenaline that a hunter has on a hunt” (CNN). This prowar enthusiasm extended to comments by newscasters such as Dan Rather, host of CBS Evening News, telling his audience that “the FBI has done a terrific job to defend us against terrorists,” following news that the U.S. had detained and questioned hundreds of Arab Americans.

As the war went on, news stories continued referring to “picture-perfect assaults” (CBS) and the “brilliance of laser-guided bombs” (ABC) just seconds after they occurred. Visually, the networks focused on wrecked vehicles, buildings, and a “bomb’s-eye” view of precision strikes. There was very little attention paid to who these assaults were targeting, and rarely was the human toll shown. If the war’s casualties were too blatant to be avoided by the media, as when the U.S. destroyed a civilian bomb shelter and killed hundreds, reporters put the onus on Saddam Hussein by saying that “he put these innocents in harm’s way” and “he promised a bloody war, here is the blood” (NBC). The bombing of buildings was considered to be more palatable for the evening news audience, even though that destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure had a devastating impact on the country that lasted for decades. U.S. bombs destroyed the entire electrical power system, which led to a lack of water purification, sewage treatment, and more infrastructural failures that caused waterborne diseases and simple illnesses to affect thousands of Iraqis. This context was rarely provided on the U.S. networks. As Richard Haass, a special assistant to President Bush, stated in a November 1991 New York Times interview, television was "our chief tool . . . selling our policy."

Attempts to present a more honest assessment on television were nearly impossible. Almost all the information came straight from military briefings, and only specifically selected journalists were allowed to visit the front lines. After these visits, they had to follow strict guidelines about what was allowed to be reported and what wasn’t. On rare occasions, some unfiltered news slipped through these press restrictions via other mediums. Photojournalist Kenneth Jarecke’s photo of an incinerated Iraqi soldier was quickly pulled from the Associated Press, Time, and Life magazine after a public outcry, but it was published by The Observer in the UK and Libération in France to intense scrutiny.

The Military's Role in Media Production

From the start, the Bush administration and military leaders determined that the media depiction should promote the view that the U.S. was fighting a just war. To ensure this message of the U.S. as the good guys, new media protocols would have to be enacted. A ten-page policy statement entitled “Annex Foxtrot” laid out these new protocols, which dictated that “press pools” containing select reporters were allowed to visit the front lines only with military escort. Whether a journalist was able to talk to someone, even when they were able to talk, would be determined by the military. Most information would only be released through military briefings. Any photographs or live videos shown on television would have to be approved before broadcast by military censors. These new rules were justified on national security grounds, however even skeptics within the popular television news media had no choice but to comply with the administration’s demands.

Impact of News Broadcasts

Were the military policies and media jingoism effective? One study at the time found that the more Americans watched television news during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq, the more likely they were to support the war effort. This study by researchers at the University of Massachusetts conducted during the war also illuminated what viewers learned and did not learn from the televised coverage: 13 percent of respondents knew that the Bush administration had initially told Saddam Hussein in July 1990 that the U.S. was neutral in the Kuwait dispute, while 81 percent knew that “Patriot missiles were used to shoot down Iraqi scuds.” Perhaps most consequently, the study asked “heavy viewers,” who watched more than three hours of television a day, to estimate the number of Iraqi deaths in the first month of the U.S. invasion. The mean number of estimated deaths was 789, nearly 10,000–15,000 fewer than the actual number. These observations suggest that the media policies created an audience that was less informed and believed the war was far less violent than the reality.

The new media policies implemented in the Gulf War have had a lasting impact on the public’s relationship with television news and the relationship between the government and news organizations. These policies paved the way for more coordinated news narratives during the Second Gulf War (2003–2011), such as those constructed by the Pentagon military analyst program, which fed select reporters specific information in exchange for favorable coverage. However, the creation and popularization of social media has meant that television coverage no longer holds the largest news audience, leaving a vacuum embraced by honest independent journalists without government connections, and conspiracy theorists spreading misinformation. As of 2022, 47 percent of people ages 18–34 use social media as their primary news source compared to the 9 percent and 10 percent that use network and cable news respectively, marking a generational shift that the U.S. government’s media policies in future wars will be forced to adapt to.

Reflection Questions

In Document 1, how does the behind-the-scenes footage of the CNN production crew influence the way you view the cable news program?

In Document 2, the political and military leaders justify the decision to restrict the way the press would operate by citing security concerns. In what ways are security concerns enough of a justification for a less open press during a time of war?

How was twenty-four-hour television coverage of the war useful for the U.S. government and military?

Is the independence and integrity of journalism jeopardized by a close relationship with the government? Why and why not?

Additional Reading

Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War. (New York: Routledge, 1992).

Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of News Media. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).

John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the 1991 Gulf War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

Stefanie Le, The Relationship Between the Media and the Military (master's thesis, Harvard Extension School, 2016).

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