The Gulf War: A Study of the Media, Public Opinion, and Public Knowledge

Background: Two weeks after the U.S. bombed Baghdad at the start of the Gulf War in 1991, researchers at the Center for Study of Communication Research at the University of Massachusetts Amherst conducted a study to investigate how news coverage was shaping public opinion about the war. Their conclusions, based on telephone interviews with 250 Coloradans and excerpted here, revealed the impact of the government’s control of media’s access to information about the war.

One explanation that might account for the media's failure to communicate certain basic information (particularly information, as we have suggested, that undermines the Administration's war policy) is that people are simply not watching the news. However, as this and other surveys have discovered, people watch a great deal of TV news. They may not be watching it carefully, but they are certainly watching it. Moreover, as we have demonstrated, some information (usually information that "fits" the Bush Administration line) is undoubtedly getting through.

What our study revealed, in fact, is that TV news seems to confuse more than it clarifies. Even after controlling for all other variables, we discovered that the correlation between TV watching and knowledge was actually quite often a negative one.

Our respondents were divided into three groups based upon how much television per day they reported watching—light viewers (less than 1.5 hrs), medium viewers (1.5 to 3 hrs), and heavy viewers (more than 3 hrs). Using these divisions, we found that overall, the more TV people watched, the less they knew.

For example, light viewers were more than twice as likely than heavy viewers to know that in the pre-invasion discussions between Iraq and the U.S., the American position had been to indicate that no action would be taken against Hussein should he invade Kuwait. Conversely, 70% of heavy viewers versus 59% of light viewers thought that the U.S. had informed Iraq that they would protect Kuwait with the use of force. Concerning past U.S. relations with Iraq, heavy viewers were less likely than light viewers (46% to 67%) to know that the U.S. had supported Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war. . . .

One of our most striking findings concerned the perception of how much damage the intense bombing of Iraq and Iraqi troops had caused. When we asked people to estimate the number of Iraqi deaths thus far, light viewers gave a mean estimate of 9,848 deaths (by February 4, 1991), while heavy viewers gave a mean figure of 789 (8% of the light viewers' estimate). The question here is not about accuracy but about relative perceptions—clearly heavy viewers were more inclined than light viewers to buy into the idea that the war was being fought cleanly and efficiently with "smart" bombs that were only damaging buildings. The lack of visual pictures of actual dead people no doubt helps to cultivate this image of cleanliness. . . .

A quarter of those supporting the war have been misled into supposing that this is a "fight for democracy". Similarly, only 10% of strong supporters were aware that the US had failed to warn Hussein of their response to an invasion, compared to 27% of non-supporters. Additionally, 71% of strong supporters as opposed to 46% of opponents erroneously thought that the U.S. said it would support Kuwait with the use of force. In relation to the Palestinian uprising on the West Bank opponents of the war were more than twice as likely to be able to identify the Intifada than strong supporters (24% to 12%). One of the few facts that supporters were more aware of was the name of the Patriot missile.

Source: Justin Lewis, et al., “The Gulf War : A Study of the Media, Public Opinion & Public Knowledge,” Center for the Study of Communication, Research Archives, March 1991.