Reminiscences of an Active Life: The Autobiography of John Roy Lynch

Background: Born into slavery in Louisiana, John R. Lynch was appointed Justice of the Peace in Natchez, Mississippi, in April, 1869, when he was 22 years old. He remained as Justice of the Peace for only a few months; that fall he was elected to the Mississippi state legislature and went on to serve as Speaker of the Mississippi House of Representatives. He was eventually elected to represent Mississippi’s 6th district in the U.S. House of Representatives. In this account from his autobiography (posthumously published in 1970), Lynch describes how he carefully navigated the expectations of white and Black residents of Natchez when he served as Justice of the Peace.

I had, at first, serious doubts of my own ability to discharge the duties of the office creditably and acceptably, but I accepted the position with a determination to fill it, if possible, with credit to myself and satisfaction to the public. With that end in view, I took advantage of every spare moment to read and study, not only the manual, but the code and statutes defining the duties of justice of the peace. . . .

The duties of the office I soon found out to be much more important than I at first supposed they were. A justice of the peace at that time had original jurisdiction in all civil cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed three hundred dollars. In criminal cases he had jurisdiction concurrent with the county court in all cases below the grade of felony, and in felonious and capital cases he could sit as a committing magistrate, examine the witnesses, and decide whether or not the testimony was sufficient to bind the accused over to the next grand jury, with or without bail, to fix the amount and accept or reject such bondsmen as might be offered. If, in his opinion, the testimony was not sufficient to justify holding the accused over to the next grand jury, or if, in his opinion, the testimony established the fact that the act was committed in self-defense or from any other reason was justifiable, he could discharge the accused from further custody. While his decision was not final and therefore not a bar to further action by a higher court, it had, nevertheless, an important bearing upon any subsequent action that might be taken.

To have a young and inexperienced colored man placed in charge of such an important office was looked upon by many, even of his warmest personal friends, with serious misgivings. But after several months had passed these misgivings had entirely disappeared. I soon found out that many of both races had an erroneous and exaggerated idea about the office. While some of the whites looked upon it with an apprehension that the facts did not warrant, some of the blacks on the other hand magnified it far beyond its importance. Some of them were determined to take advantage of the smallest and most unimportant offense to “come to law.” To them this was something that was entirely new, and they were anxious to avail themselves of such a glorious privilege. And then, some of them believed that because a colored man was in charge of the office they would have a better standing in court than they otherwise would. It did not require very much time for me to take in the situation and decide upon a course of action that would avoid and prevent friction.

Frequent complaints were made to me by colored servants alleging maltreatment by the white employer. In nearly every case the complaining party was the female cook or housemaid, while the party complained of was the white female head of the house. Instead of issuing a warrant for the arrest of the accused in all such cases, I would write a note to the male head of the house, who was usually engaged in business in the city, informing him of what had been alleged and suggesting that he take the necessary steps to prevent further action in the case. This note I would sometimes send by the complaining party, and other times by the office constable. In every case it had the desired effect. The matter was always adjusted in a way satisfactory to all concerned. These men would either write me or thank me in person when they would meet me on the street for the courtesy and consideration thus shown. . . .

There was one case, however, in which the complaining party was the colored female cook and the party complained of was the male head of the family. The personal appearance of the complaining party gave evidence of the fact that her statements were not wholly groundless. In that case the warrant was issued and the defendant was brought before the court, tried, and convicted. But since it was the first offense the fine imposed was very light—five dollars and costs, which the defendant promptly paid. About ten days later the defendant was again brought before the court, the complaining party being the same as in the first case. This time he had committed an assault and battery in a more aggravated form than on the first occasion. When the charge was read to him and he was asked to state whether or not he was guilty as charged, he put his head close to mine and asked in a low tone of voice how much the fine would be if he should plead guilty as charged. The answer was that the court could enter into no agreement with him about the case—that he was either guilty or not guilty. If he should plead not guilty we would proceed to trial. If he should plead guilty the court would then determine what the fine should be. “Well,” he said, “I guess I will run risk. I am guilty.” “Very well,” said the court. “Since this is the second offense a fine of ten dollars is imposed and in default of payment the defendant will be confined in the county jail for a period of five days.” “Do what?” he exclaimed. “Ten dollars and costs? Then I withdraw the plea. I am not guilty ten dollars worth. Do you want to take all of my money?” He was informed that the court had rendered its decision and that he must govern himself accordingly. With much reluctance and after much protesting, he paid the fine and costs and departed. It was the last time I had him before me while I remained in charge of the office.

Another case of some significance that came before me was that of a white man that I knew unfavorably and well. He had cursed, abused, and threatened the life of an innocent and inoffensive old colored man on account of a misunderstanding over a small business transaction. Upon the complaint of the colored man, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the party against whom the complaint was made. When he was brought before the court and the charges had been read to him and he was asked whether or not he was guilty as charged, he seemed to be somewhat surprised. “Why,” he remarked, “do you mean to tell me that it is a crime for a white man to curse a nigger?” “Yes,” the court replied. “It is as much a crime for a white man to curse a Negro as it is for a Negro to curse a white man.” “Well!” he exclaimed, “that’s news to me. You certainly must be mistaken. If there is such a law I have never heard of it.” The court then handed him the code and told him where he could find the section bearing upon the point at issue and requested him to read it for himself, which he did.

When he had finished, he exclaimed in a somewhat subdued tone: “Well I’ll be damned.” The court then admonished him that if that remark should be repeated he would be committed to the county jail for contempt of court. He quickly apologized and assured the court that no disrespect was intended. He said he could not deny having used the language set forth in the affidavit, but he hoped the court would not be severe because he did not know and did not believe that in using that language he was violating any law. Since it was his first offense he was let off with a fine of five dollars and costs which he promptly paid. It was the first and only time that he was brought before me.