James Madison Opposes Legislative Role in Electing President

Background: As the delegates gathered at the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787, James Madison of Virginia, one of the convention’s most influential participants (and a future President), took extensive notes recording the substance of their debates over various aspects of the new government they were trying to create. In this excerpt from his notes about what mechanism the new government should use to elect the head of its executive branch (here referred to as the “Chief Magistrate” and what they would eventually decide to call President), Madison details his concerns about the kinds of political and financial corruption that might result from giving that power to Congress. Note: this document includes Madison’s abbreviations of words.

There are objections agst. every mode that has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made either by some existing authority under the Natil. or State Constitutions--or by some special authority derived from the people--or by the people themselves. -- The two Existing authorities under the Natl. Constitution wd be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the question The former was in his Judgment liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The Ministers of foreign powers would have and make use of the opportunity to mix their intrigues & influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the head of our Governmt. a man attached to their respective politics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps expense, will be spared to gain from the Legislature an appointmt.

Source: Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. 2 (1911), 109.